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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the very limited literature on the implementation of EU external 
migration policy. Cooperation with non-EU countries has become a central policy priority for 
the EU over the past decade, with the main policy tool being the Mobility Partnership 
framework. Since 2008, seven such partnerships have been signed with countries in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. Since the Commission’s 2009 evaluation, however, little has been written 
about how the Mobility Partnerships are playing out in practice. This paper addresses this 
deficit, and focuses in particular on the concept of mobility. It first attempts to assess the 
whether the Mobility Partnerships have created extra channels of migration from the non-EU 
countries concerned to the EU. However, the paper concludes that implementation is still at 
too early a stage, and no sound conclusion can be drawn regarding the overall contribution of 
the Mobility Partnerships to mobility. Instead, the paper applies the literature on 
implementation in a ‘backward’ fashion: starting with the implementation dynamics at play, it 
concludes that successful implementation of the Mobility Partnerships will depend on the 
particular third country and project concerned. 
  
1. Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, EU policy documents emphasise the importance of cooperating with 
non-EU countries on migration issues. Policy instruments have been created and brought 
together under the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (Commission, 2011), and 
project funding has been made available under successive EU funding instruments. This has 
spawned a sizeable literature on EU external migration policy, with scholars examining policy 
content and policy-making dynamics (e.g. Boswell, 2003; Coleman, 2009; Weinar, 2011). 
And yet at the same time the literature on implementation of EU external migration policy has 
remained extremely limited (Wunderlich, 2013; 2012). This is puzzling, and unsatisfactory. 
Implementation research matters because, simply put, “putting a piece of legislation or a 
government programme into practice does not happen automatically, nor is it a purely 
technical or apolitical affair” (Treib, 2006, p.5). Policy in theory (on paper) is one thing; 
policy in practice may be quite another (Versluis, 2004, p.13). Implementation research in EU 
external migration policy matters because the policy area is so salient. Given that cooperation 
with third countries on migration continues to be stressed in EU policy documents (e.g. 
Commission, 2014b), there is a pressing need to understand how this policy is implemented in 
practice. This paper provides a first step in this direction, by assessing the potential for 
successful implementation of the EU’s Mobility Partnerships. The Mobility Partnerships are 
selected as the object of study because they are the “main strategic, comprehensive and long-
term cooperation framework for migration management with third countries”.1 Section 2 
introduces the Mobility Partnership instrument and argues that a definitive assessment of 
implementation is premature. Section 3 distils some central concepts from the implementation 
literature, which are applied in section 4 in order to determine the potential for successful 
implementation of the Mobility Partnerships. The conclusion argues that, although the 
voluntary nature of the policy instrument might remove several obstacles to implementation, a 
blanket assessment of the Mobility Partnerships is not possible: outcomes will depend on the 
specific third country and project concerned. 
 
2. The ‘Mobility’ Partnerships 
The concept of Mobility Partnerships was introduced by the Commission in 2007 
(Commission, 2007). The aim was to create “novel approaches to improve the management of 
legal movements of people between the EU and third countries” (p.2). The central idea is that 
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 Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing the 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund. OJ L 150 volume 47, p.168. 
legal migration opportunities will be offered to third countries in return for their cooperation 
on preventing irregular migration (p.3); in practice, this has come to mean that Mobility 
Partnerships include the signature of both readmission and visa facilitation agreements 
(Commission, 2011, p.11). Indeed, the fact that the communication setting out the Mobility 
Partnership concept also addresses circular migration seems to emphasise the centrality of 
‘mobility’ for this policy instrument. To date, Mobility Partnerships have been signed with 
Moldova (2008), Cape Verde (2008), Georgia (2009), Armenia (2011), Morocco (2013), 
Azerbaijan (2013), and Tunisia (2014). 
 Mobility Partnerships are signed as political declarations, setting out the intent of the 
Commission, the third country concerned, and participating member states to cooperate on 
migration issues. Appended to this declaration is a list of projects for implementation; projects 
may be proposed by any of the parties to a Mobility Partnership, but in reality most projects 
have been carried out by member states (Reslow, 2013, p.138). A Mobility Partnerships is 
best understood as an ‘umbrella’, bringing together the various individual projects. 
Participation by member states is voluntary, which has led to varied patterns of opting in and 
out by the different member states, ranging from France (which participates in all 
partnerships) to Austria, Finland, Ireland and Malta (which do not participate in any 
partnerships). All other member states are located somewhere between these extremes, 
participating in some, but not all, partnerships.
2
 
 Once a Mobility Partnership has been negotiated and signed (see Reslow, 2013, 
p.129), it is implemented through the implementation of the projects proposed. 
Implementation is monitored at the EU level through a Mobility Partnership task force, and at 
the local level through a cooperation platform in the third country concerned. The 
Commission plays a key role in the task force by organising meetings and updating the 
scoreboard – a document produced for each Mobility Partnership which shows all the projects 
being implemented and their state of play. Member states’ embassies, EU delegations and 
third countries’ authorities meet in the framework of cooperation platforms to monitor 
implementation of the projects (Commission, 2009a, pp.5-6). 
The literature on the implementation of EU external migration policy is extremely 
limited. Initial academic assessments of the Mobility Partnerships have focused on the 
decision-making process. Member states ‘wrangle’ amongst themselves to ensure that EU 
policy favours third countries with which they have a special relationship (Parkes, 2009, 
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 Croatia has, since becoming an EU member state in 2013, not yet opted to participate in any Mobility 
Partnerships. 
p.343). At the same time, they maintain strict control over the form and content of the 
Mobility Partnerships, thus severely limiting the Commission’s room for manoeuvre (Reslow, 
2013, p.229). The exclusion of the European Parliament from the policy-making process has 
“marginalised any sort of democratic accountability” of this policy instrument (Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera, 2011, p.106). Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera (2011) also consider the 
human rights implications of the Mobility Partnerships: they label these partnerships 
‘insecurity partnerships’ because “they undermine the coherence of EU policy on labour 
immigration and increase the vulnerability of third country workers’ human rights in Europe” 
(p.97).  
Despite their name and the centrality of the idea of mobility as put forward by the 
Commission (see above), several authors argue that labour mobility schemes have been 
lacking in the Mobility Partnerships concluded to date (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 
2011; Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Parkes, 2009; Reslow, 2013; see, however, Cassarino, 
2009, who characterises Mobility Partnerships as ‘a new generation of temporary labour-
migration schemes’). These judgements are based on a reading of the Mobility Partnership 
texts only; however, due to their non-binding nature, full implementation of the proposed 
projects cannot be guaranteed (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 2011, p.110). On the other 
hand, given that Commission officials see each Mobility Partnership as a ‘living document’ 
(Reslow, 2013, p.136), implementation in practice may not precisely reflect the text of the 
agreement: new projects on mobility may be added later, that were not originally foreseen.  
Given the (at least nominal) importance attached to the concept of mobility, and the 
rather sceptical initial assessments by scholars, it makes sense to judge Mobility Partnerships 
in terms of their contribution to mobility.
3
 This can be done in different ways, for instance in 
terms of nationals of Mobility Partnership countries moving and taking up residence in the 
EU. Figure 1 shows the number of first residence permits issued by the 28 EU member states 
to citizens of the Mobility Partnership countries, based on Eurostat data. The cross on each 
line indicates when the Mobility Partnership with the country concerned was signed. Eurostat 
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 Mobility Partnerships can also be judged in terms of their contribution to the prevention of irregular migration. 
This is somewhat less tangible, as assessing the absence of a phenomenon invites counterfactual reasoning. An 
alternative approach would be to analyse the numbers of persons readmitted under the readmission agreements in 
place with Mobility Partnership countries. However, reliable and comparable data sources are lacking in this 
respect. The 2014 study by the European Migration Network on readmission practices by the member states 
(European Migration Network, 2014) suffers from some weaknesses: data was only provided by 13 member 
states; the data provided is not complete with respect to the Mobility Partnership countries (e.g. not all member 
states provided data on the numbers of readmissions under the agreement with Moldova); and some readmission 
agreements with Mobility Partnership countries have not yet been concluded/entered into force, so that a 
meaningful evaluation is not yet possible. 
data is currently only available up to 2013; Morocco, Azerbaijan and Tunisia are therefore not 
included, as their Mobility Partnerships were agreed in 2013 and 2014. Eurostat data is only 
available from 2008; the Mobility Partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde were agreed in 
2008, meaning that for these two countries the data does not show the situation before. 
Nevertheless, it shows very clearly in the case of Moldova that, since 2008, the number of 
first residence permits issued by EU member states has dropped significantly. None of the 
Mobility Partnership countries has seen a consistent and significant increase in the number of 
residence permits being issued. This may be a very crude measurement of ‘mobility’, but it 
nevertheless implies that the Mobility Partnerships have not led to greater numbers of citizens 
from these countries moving to EU countries. 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of residence permits issued by the EU 28 member states to citizens of Mobility Partnership 
countries (source: Eurostat). The data concerns residence permits issued for more than 3 months, for all purposes 
(family reunification, remunerated activities, education, and other purposes). 
 
 Visa facilitation agreements are an important component of the Mobility Partnerships, 
and the Commission has made clear that the dual signature of visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements is what sets the Mobility Partnerships apart from other instruments, 
such as the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (Commission, 2011, p.11). Figure 2 
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therefore attempts to assess this aspect of mobility, by charting the numbers of short-stay 
visas issued to citizens of Mobility Partnership countries. This is based on data by the 
European Commission; however this data is only available for 2010-2013.
4
 This is the biggest 
hurdle to assessing visa facilitation agreements: they were mostly agreed after the Mobility 
Partnerships had been signed, meaning ratification and implementation are ongoing or at an 
early stage.
5
 Therefore, figure 2 is only meaningful for the case of Georgia, where the visa 
facilitation agreement entered into force in 2011.  
It is therefore, at this stage of implementation, not possible to definitively determine 
the contribution of Mobility Partnerships to mobility. Definitive assessments of 
implementation success/failure may take years because of the data and evidence required to 
make such an assessment (Ripley and Franklin, 1982, p.203). Instead, this paper will apply 
the literature on implementation in a ‘backward’ fashion: instead of beginning from an 
observed successful/failed policy implementation and tracing this back to the implementation 
dynamics, the paper begins from the implementation dynamics in order to determine what we 
might expect from the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships. Such an analysis can 
facilitate projections about the performance and impact of a particular policy (p.204). As this 
approach is ambivalent regarding the final outcome of implementation, it also avoids the 
accusation commonly levelled at implementation scholars that they focus too much on policy 
failures (deLeon, 1999, p.329). The following section distils some central explanatory 
concepts from the literature on implementation. 
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 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-
policy/index_en.htm. The data suffers from several additional weaknesses: it does not include the UK, Ireland or 
Croatia; data for Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus is patchy, therefore these have been excluded, although this is 
problematic as e.g. Romania issues a significant number of short-stay visas to Moldovan citizens; and the data 
concerns visas issued by location of member states’ embassies, not according to citizenship of the person 
receiving the visa. 
5
 The visa facilitation agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan entered into force in 2014, and the visa 
facilitation agreement with Cape Verde has still to be ratified. 
 Figure 2: Number of short-stay visas issued to citizens of Mobility Partnership countries (source: Commission; 
author’s own calculations). 
 
3. Defining and assessing implementation 
This paper borrows from the literature on the implementation of public policy in order to 
develop an analytical framework for assessing the implementation of EU external migration 
policy. Firstly, it is important to define precisely what is meant by implementation. This is 
especially so given that some authors writing on EU external migration policy claim to 
analyse ‘implementation’ whilst actually studying decision-making or policy-making. 
Wunderlich (2012), for instance, examines why Morocco and Ukraine “have agreed to co-
operation on illegal migration” (p.1423), and highlights the concerns of Moroccan and 
Ukrainian actors concerning migration flows and the requirements of an EU readmission 
agreement. His analysis therefore concerns broader processes motivating these governments’ 
decisions and relationship with the EU, but not how implementation of specific projects is 
functioning. Seeberg’s (2014) article refers to the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships 
in the title, but actually concerns the prospect of conclusion of new partnership in the future, 
which belongs rather to the decision-making than implementation stage. Naturally it may be 
difficult to draw a firm distinction between policy-making and policy implementation, to the 
extent that implementation processes feed into policy formation in an iterative process of 
feedback and evaluation (Hill and Hupe, 2002, p.139; Nakamura, 1987). Nevertheless, this 
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paper attempts to draw such a distinction, by differentiating between the process leading up to 
the signature of individual Mobility Partnerships (decision-making) and everything that 
happens afterwards (implementation). 
It is also necessary to differentiate ‘implementation’ from the notions of ‘impact’ or 
‘policy effectiveness’. ‘Impact’ refers to the consequences of a policy decision (i.e. “what 
happened”) and ‘implementation’ refers to the dynamics and factors which explain 
programme performance (i.e. “why did it happen in this way”). Policy impact is therefore the 
extent to which policy objectives were achieved, and implementation studies examine the 
factors contributing to this realisation/non-realisation of policy objectives (van Meter and van 
Horn, 1975, p.448). Some scholars also distinguish between ‘outputs’ (implementation 
behaviour) and ‘outcomes’ (goal achievement), although Hill and Hupe (2002, p.146) note 
difficulties with accurately measuring outcomes and correctly attributing them to the policy 
concerned. Section 2 above argued that it is too early to assess the impact of the Mobility 
Partnerships on mobility. Instead, this paper focuses on implementation dynamics.  
The literature on EU compliance suffers from the problem that it has focussed 
extensively on the implementation of EU legislation (e.g. Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2008; 
Bursens, 2002; Hartlapp, 2007). Bursens (2002), for instance, focuses on the transposition of 
directives into member states’ national law, and defines implementation as “the whole of the 
actions exercised by the various relevant authorities of the member state in order to effect 
European legislation within that member state” (p.175). This is problematic for EU external 
migration policy for two main reasons: it is unhelpful in terms of what to look for, and where 
to look. EU external migration policy is not based on legislation, and little of it is legally-
binding (apart from readmission and visa facilitation agreements, which are international 
agreements). It is thus futile to look for evidence of member states adopting supportive 
national legislation. Equally, focusing on EU legislation reduces implementation to an internal 
EU affair and a matter of the dynamics at play between the EU institutions and the member 
states, and within the member states national administrations. EU external migration policy, 
however, relies on third countries for implementation (Wunderlich, 2013, p.409).  
This paper therefore looks to the broader public policy literature on implementation, 
which has highlighted a number of factors required for successful policy implementation.
6
 
These factors draw on both the top-down perspective (analysing those factors that central 
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 This paper does not engage with the ‘top-down versus bottom-up’ debate within implementation research (see 
e.g. Matland, 1995), but draws mainly on the work of the scholars writing from the top-down perspective. This 
choice is made because the paper focuses on a particular policy instrument (the Mobility Partnerships) (cf. 
Sabatier, 1986, p.37). 
policy-makers can control) and the bottom-up perspective (analysing those factors outside the 
control of central policy-makers). Successful policy implementation depends firstly on the 
tractability of the problem being addressed: there must be a clear understanding of the link 
between the problem and the solutions which can address this problem, and existing practices 
causing the problem should not be diverse (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pp.541-544; 
Goggin et al., 1990, p.35).  
Secondly, successful policy implementation is more likely if the new policy does not 
deviate substantially from previous policies: “incremental changes are more likely to 
engender a positive response than will drastic ones” (van Meter and van Horn, 1975, p.458; 
cf. Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, p.543; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2008, p.277). Knill and 
Lenschow (2000, p.32) refer to a ‘bounded space for innovation’, which is the fine line 
between requiring “something, but not too much”. 
Thirdly, policy objectives which are clear and are ranked in terms of their relative 
importance are more likely to be successfully implemented (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, 
p.545; Goggin et al., 1990, p.35).
7
 
Fourthly, implementing agencies must have financial and organisational resources 
(meaning an adequate number of skilled staff) available to ensure successful implementation 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, p.545; van Meter and van Horn, 1975, p.471).  
Fifthly, successful implementation is more likely if implementing agencies are 
integrated in a single hierarchical structure (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, p.546; van Meter 
and van Horn, 1975, pp.466-467). In political systems where multiple actors are in charge of 
implementing a single policy, “command from the centre, control by the centre, and 
obedience by those commanded and controlled” cannot be taken for granted (Ripley and 
Franklin, 1982, p.188). This is not surprising given that these political systems (like the 
United States federal structure and the European Union) were designed to limit the authority 
of central government (Hill and Hupe, 2002, p.72). The degree of hierarchical integration 
amongst implementing agencies depends on the number of actors who have the opportunity to 
prevent policy objectives being achieved, and on the availability of inducements and sanctions 
to ensure that actors act in accordance with policy objectives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, 
p.546). These inducements/sanctions can take various forms: the threat of punishment for 
non-compliance; the transfer of knowledge and resources to actors facing difficulties 
complying; and persuading actors to change their underlying norms and values (Hartlapp, 
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 Matland (1995, p.158) opposes this view, arguing that ambiguity can be purposely built into a policy in order to 
facilitate compromise in the decision-making process. Policy clarity may therefore actually be dysfunctional. 
2007). Sanctions and punishment are most effective when there is a direct hierarchical 
relationship between the two sets of actors concerned (Matland, 1995, p.164). 
Sixthly, an understanding of the interests and motives of implementing officials is 
necessary for a full understanding of the implementation process (Hill and Hupe, 2002, 
p.152). Implementation is more likely to be successful if implementing officials agree with 
the policy objectives. This can be ensured by their inclusion in the policy-making process 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, p.547; van Meter and van Horn, 1975, pp.459).  
Finally, economic, social and political conditions can all affect the public and political 
support for a policy. Changing socio-economic conditions can make the problem being 
addressed by the policy relatively less important, and thus decrease public and political 
support. Media attention affects the perception of importance of an issue, and so policies 
which receive sustained media coverage are more likely to be successfully implemented. 
Public opinion influences the political agenda, and so a policy which has high support 
amongst the public and is perceived as being highly salient is more likely to be successfully 
implemented. Interest groups and elites mobilising in favour of a policy also affect 
implementation (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pp.548-550; van Meter and van Horn, 1975, 
pp.471-472; Goggin et al., 1990, p.39).  
Figure 3 below summarises the framework outlined above, and in particular the 
direction of the effect expected for each factor.
8
 This figure also shows implementation as a 
continuum between ‘failed’ and ‘successful’, in order to escape the tendency in 
implementation research to assume and focus on policy failure (Hill and Hupe, 2002, p.140). 
In the following section, these factors will be applied to the Mobility Partnerships, in order to 
determine whether the implementation of these partnerships is likely to be successful. 
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 This is a problem in the framework proposed by van Meter and van Horn: they posit “six variables which shape 
the linkage between policy and performance” (1975, p.462) but are not always explicit about the nature of that 
linkage. 
Successful                                                Failed 
implementation              implementation 
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -| 
1. Valid causal theory                Invalid causal theory 
2. Incremental change                    Substantial change 
3. Clear policy objectives                                   Ambiguous policy objectives 
4. Sufficient financial/organisational resources        Lacking financial/organisational resources 
5. Single hierarchical structure                No hierarchical integration 
6. Positive disposition of implementers         Negative disposition of implementers 
7. Favourable socio-economic conditions    Unfavourable socio-economic conditions 
8. Media coverage                 No sustained media coverage 
9. Supportive public opinion                 Public opinion opposed 
10. Interest groups/elites mobilising in favour    Interest groups/elites mobilising against  
Figure 3: Assessing implementation 
 
4. Implementation dynamics in EU Mobility Partnerships 
4.1 Link between problem and solution 
An analysis of EU policy documents suggests that, at least within the EU, there is a clear 
understanding that the problem to be addressed is the management of migration flows to the 
EU, and the solution to this problem is cooperation with third countries. Since the early 
2000s, EU policy documents argue that cooperation with third countries is the key to 
preventing irregular migration to the EU (e.g. Commission, 2001), and that such cooperation 
needs to be incentivised, for instance by linking the signature of readmission agreements to 
visa facilitation agreements (Council, 2005). However, it is not clear that third countries 
necessarily share this view. Cooperating with the EU on the prevention of irregular migration 
may be coupled with high social, political and economic costs (Weinar, 2011; Coleman, 2009; 
Ellermann, 2008). For third countries the issue is not one of preventing irregular emigration, 
but rather about securing better access for their citizens to EU territory.  
 Existing practices by member states in the area of external migration policy are 
diverse. France, for instance, has signed agreements with third countries on the management 
of migration flows, which are very similar to Mobility Partnerships in that they encompass 
legal migration, visas, readmission, police cooperation, reintegration, and development 
(European Migration Network, 2010a, p.45). The Austrian government, on the other hand, 
implements assisted voluntary return programmes and information campaigns about the 
dangers of irregular migration (European Migration Network, 2010b), but does not facilitate 
temporary or circular migration to Austria due to the experiences with the guest-worker 
schemes in the 1960s and 1970s. Whilst the literature on implementation suggests that such 
diversity will negatively affect policy implementation, the voluntary nature of the Mobility 
Partnerships might mitigate this: member states whose existing policy practices do not match 
well with the Mobility Partnership approach may well choose not to participate, as is the case 
with Austria (Reslow, 2013). Whether this makes for a smoother implementation process 
must be established empirically in future research. 
 
4.2 Nature of change required 
Mobility Partnerships sit at the crossroads of migration policy and foreign policy. These two 
policy areas are politically sensitive and important to state sovereignty. Control over entry 
into a country’s territory “is often seen as one of the last bastions of national sovereignty” 
(Lavenex, 2011, p.2). EU migration policy is filled with caveats, particularly references to 
member states’ continued competence to admit third-country nationals to their labour markets 
(see e.g. article 1(b) of the Single Permit Directive). Foreign policy is at the core of national 
sovereignty, and although member states conduct a significant amount of their foreign policy 
objectives through the EU context, they maintain their own distinct priorities, preferences, and 
privileged relationship with individual third countries. 
 A policy instrument requiring any change in this nexus between migration policy and 
foreign policy might then be expected to engender opposition. The overall objective of the 
Mobility Partnerships to enhance migration opportunities for citizens of the third country 
concerned certainly does not seem to fit well with the tendency by most member states 
towards restrictive immigration policies. However, Mobility Partnerships do not in reality 
require all that much change by member states, given their voluntary nature. Member states 
are free in their choice of which projects to propose; indeed, despite the overall aim of the 
Mobility Partnerships to combine cooperation on irregular and legal migration, the Mobility 
Partnerships with Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia did not include many projects aiming to 
create new channels of migration (Reslow, 2013, p.138). 
 A separate issue concerns the nature of change required by the other partner in the 
implementation process, namely the third country concerned. This will depend on the 
particular third country. The most onerous requirement associated with a Mobility Partnership 
is the signature of a readmission agreement. However, with some third countries (like 
Moldova) a readmission agreement may already exist before the signature of a Mobility 
Partnership. The change required for such a country will be less than for a country (like 
Morocco) that has been in arduous, drawn-out negotiations with the EU over a readmission 
agreement for several years.  
 
4.3 Clarity of policy objectives 
Although the overall objective of the Mobility Partnerships – better legal migration 
opportunities for third countries that commit themselves to cooperating with the EU on 
preventing irregular migration – is relatively unambiguous, the Commission communication 
lists many possible types of projects that could fall under a Mobility Partnership (see 
Commission, 2007, pp.4-8). Member states might for instance suggest projects in the area of 
legal migration, capacity building, preventing brain drain, or visas. The communication is also 
rather vague regarding the legal nature of Mobility Partnerships, stating only that they “will 
necessarily have a complex legal nature” (p.3). The very name ‘Mobility Partnership’ caused 
confusion at the outset of the policy instrument, with member states being concerned that they 
would be forced to offer legal migration opportunities (Reslow, 2013, p.127). The 
Commission communication does not rank the different types of projects in terms of their 
relative importance, and does not assign more weight to either the commitments by third 
countries on irregular migration or the commitments by member states on legal migration.  
 The clarity of policy objectives is further compromised by the preamble to each 
individual Mobility Partnership, which states the aims of cooperation. While these are largely 
similar, some differences emerge. A Mobility Partnership is always linked to the existing 
frameworks of cooperation, and this differs amongst third countries. In other words, the 
framing of a Mobility Partnership is not fixed but depends in the particular third country 
concerned. In addition, the first Mobility Partnerships did not include asylum as one of the 
pillars of cooperation (e.g. Council, 2008), but the later Mobility Partnerships do (e.g. 
Council, 2013). Overall then, the specific policy objectives are too numerous and potentially 
competing to be defined as ‘clear’. When the sub-goals of a policy are so numerous and 
varied, disagreement over implementation is likely to arise between actors with different 
training (Matland, 1995, p.169). In the case of the Mobility Partnerships, civil servants in 
interior/justice ministries might have different proposals for implementation than civil 
servants in foreign ministries. 
 
4.4 Financial and organisational resources available for implementation 
A consideration of the financial and organisational resources available for implementation 
must take place across three levels, as three sets of actors are involved in implementing 
Mobility Partnerships: the EU, the member states, and the third country concerned. For the 
EU level, this is a seemingly straight-forward task and answers can be sought in the 
organisational resources available to DG Migration and Home Affairs, and the financial 
resources set aside for Mobility Partnerships. The Commission’s organisational capacity on 
migration has certainly increased: from only a small task force working on justice and home 
affairs matters prior to 1999 (Lavenex, 2009, p.259), to the creation of DG JLS, and the later 
separation into what is now DG Migration and Home Affairs, with a staff of 275 on 1 January 
2014 and 295 on 1 February 2015 (Commission 2015; 2014a). The budget allocated to the 
EU’s area of freedom security and justice has also increased, from just under €580 million in 
2006,
9
 to just over €1 billion for 2010,10 to €1.2 billion for 2014.11 The 2014 work programme 
of the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund set aside €3 million to support the 
implementation of the Mobility Partnerships, focussing on Azerbaijan, Morocco, Jordan and 
Tunisia (Commission, 2014b, p.11). 
 For member states and third countries, however, it is more difficult to make firm 
statements. In small member states with small administrations, one individual civil servant 
might be responsible for a number of tasks which in a larger member state would be shared 
between several people (cf. Engelmann, 2015, p.211). In newer member states, where 
migration as a policy area is a relatively new phenomenon, experience and expertise might be 
lacking (p.129). However, it is not the case that only large/old member states are choosing to 
join the Mobility Partnerships; for example, in the Mobility Partnership with Azerbaijan, 
participating member states include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia (Council, 2013). Further research is required to establish whether there 
is a causal link between member states’ organisational capacity and their participation in 
Mobility Partnerships, and to examine the link between member states’ organisational 
capacity and implementation of the Mobility Partnerships. 
 It is equally difficult to come to a general conclusion regarding third countries. 
Empirical research has shown that both Cape Verde (which signed a Mobility Partnership) 
and Senegal (which refused to sign a Mobility Partnership) have limited organisational 
capacity in the area of migration: competence is shared between several ministries, with little 
inter-ministerial communication or coordination. It has been shown that this did not affect 
these countries’ preferences on whether or not to participate in the Mobility Partnerships 
(Reslow, 2012); however, the literature on implementation suggests this limited 
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organisational capacity will negatively affect implementation. Future research must establish 
empirically whether such a link exists. 
 
4.5 Relationship between implementing agencies 
EU external migration policy can be characterised as a ‘three-level game’, because three sets 
of actors are involved in making and implementing such policy: the EU, the member states, 
and the third countries. However, these actors are not integrated in a single hierarchical 
structure. The relationship between the EU institutions and the EU member states is 
determined by the nature of the policy area: neither migration policy nor foreign policy is 
fully communitarised (see also section 4.2 above), so competence is shared. The Mobility 
Partnerships are not legally binding international agreements, but rather political declarations 
(Commission, 2009a, p.4). This has meant that the Commission has been unable to force 
member states to implement the partnerships in a certain way. For instance, Commission 
officials favour multilateral projects over bilateral initiatives, and the funding allocated to 
Mobility Partnerships under the thematic programme for cooperation with third countries in 
the areas of migration and asylum was partly conditional on partnership between member 
states (Commission, 2009b, p.10). This inducement has not been sufficient, as the Mobility 
Partnerships are dominated by bilateral projects (Reslow, 2013, p.137). The Commission 
maintains a scoreboard of each Mobility Partnership, containing information about all the 
projects falling under the partnership and the state of implementation (Commission, 2009a, 
p.5). In theory, these scoreboards might serve a ‘naming and shaming’ function; however 
instances of projects being duplicated implies that member states’ officials do not pay too 
close attention to the scoreboards (Reslow, 2013, p.237). 
 The relationship between the EU and the third country is more difficult to characterise, 
and may well depend on the particular third country concerned. Countries in the EU’s 
immediate neighbourhood with deep ties to the EU through several frameworks (such as the 
European Neighbourhood Policy) may have more of a stake, including financially, in 
cooperation with the EU. By contrast, countries further away with less well-developed 
relations with the EU or for which cooperation with the EU is not a domestic priority, may be 
less inclined to participate in the Mobility Partnerships (see e.g. Chou and Gibert, 2012, on 
the case of Senegal). The implementation of Mobility Partnerships is overseen by local 
cooperation platforms, bringing together representatives of the government of the third 
country, member states’ embassies, and the EU delegation (Commission, 2009a, p.6). An 
examination of the nature of the interactions within these cooperation platforms would 
increase our understanding of the relationship between the actors in the Mobility Partnerships. 
 
4.6 Disposition of implementing officials 
As indicated above, three sets of actors are involved in implementing the Mobility 
Partnerships. Their dispositions towards this policy instrument are likely to be very different. 
As the idea originated in the European Commission, starting with a speech by then-
Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security Franco Frattini (Frattini, 2006), officials in 
DG Migration and Home Affairs might be expected to view Mobility Partnerships positively. 
The Commission has long emphasised the need to offer third countries a real incentive in 
return for their cooperation on preventing irregular migration, and this is what the Mobility 
Partnerships aim to do. DG Home maintains the scoreboards and has a coordinating role in 
the implementation of the partnerships. However, the position of the European External 
Action Service should also be considered, as the EU delegations (which fall under the EEAS) 
play a key role in the local cooperation platforms that oversee implementation. Boswell 
(2003) argues that then-DG JLS had very different priorities in relation to external migration 
policy than did DGs Relex and Development, and the same argument has been made with 
regard to national administrations: whereas interior ministries are ‘inward-looking’ and might 
seek to prevent entry to the national territory through the signature of readmission 
agreements, foreign ministries might view such agreements suspiciously because they spoil 
good diplomatic relations (van Selm, 2005; Pawlak, 2009). The EEAS emphasises the need to 
see the positive contributions of migration and makes no mention of ‘illegal’ migration 
(EEAS, n.d.), but in order to uncover officials’ true disposition in-depth interviews will be 
required. 
 The voluntary nature of the Mobility Partnerships, although potentially problematic in 
some respects (see e.g. section 4.5), may be linked to a positive disposition of implementing 
officials towards the policy instrument. Member states that participate have voluntarily signed 
up to do so, and have been included in the policy-making process (see Reslow, 2013). In 
many cases the projects implemented under Mobility Partnerships are not new; rather member 
states have rephrased existing initiatives that they would have carried out anyway (pp.136-
137). While this may not be very ambitious (cf. Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2008), it might 
ensure successful implementation of these projects. On the other hand, given the initial lack of 
clarity over the nature and aims of the Mobility Partnerships (see section 4.3 above), it is 
possible that some member states signed up to participate without fully understanding the 
consequences of this. Future research should try to establish links between officials’ 
dispositions in the decision-making stage and actual implementation process.  
 Despite having signed up to the Mobility Partnerships, empirical research has shown 
that officials in third countries are not necessarily positive about all aspects of this policy 
instrument. Cape Verdean government officials, for instance, were critical of the pressure put 
on them to sign the readmission agreement, because it makes them responsible for readmitting 
migrants who have merely transited through Cape Verde on their way to the EU (Reslow, 
2013, pp.207-209). Given that a Mobility Partnership encompasses various types of projects, 
covering all pillars of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, it is possible that some 
projects will be more successfully implemented than others. 
 
4.7 Effect of socio-economic conditions 
The Commission communication on Mobility Partnerships makes clear that “mechanisms to 
facilitate economic migration should be based on the labour needs of interested member 
states, as assessed by them” (Commission, 2007, p.5). The economic crisis in Europe, which 
took hold just as the first Mobility Partnerships started to be signed, led to many EU member 
states making immigration policy more restrictive, clamping down on irregular migration, and 
encouraging return migration (e.g. IOM, 2010; Kuptsch, 2012). In addition, the Commission 
communication stresses that projects within Mobility Partnerships will respect the legal 
principle of preference for EU citizens (Commission, 2007, p.5). All in all, the Mobility 
Partnerships are being implemented in unfavourable circumstances, as these socio-economic 
conditions are not conducive to the creation of new channels of immigration from non-EU 
countries. 
 
4.8 Media coverage 
The Mobility Partnerships link two issues: irregular migration, and legal immigration. There 
is plenty of media coverage of the problem of irregular migration at Europe’s borders, with 
recent coverage focusing on the fate of migrants who get into trouble in the Mediterranean 
Sea (see e.g. EUObserver, 2015; The Guardian, 2015; Euronews, 2015). However, legal 
migration is not mentioned as a solution to this problem. In fact, immigration from outside the 
EU is often negatively portrayed (see e.g. De Telegraaf, 2010; Jyllands-Posten, 2014), and 
recently the free movement of EU citizens has also been called into question (see e.g. The 
Telegraph, 2014; Financial Times, 2013). There has been no media coverage of the Mobility 
Partnerships in EU member states. 
 4.9 Public opinion 
As there has been no media coverage of the Mobility Partnerships and no public 
communication about this policy instrument by either the Commission or member states’ 
governments, there is no public knowledge of this policy instrument, making it impossible to 
judge public opinion. Public opinion on irregular migration and legal immigration in general, 
however, may be a useful proxy measure. It is clear that many Europeans are sceptical about 
immigration from non-EU countries (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2012, p.20; The Guardian, 2011; 
Pew Research Center, 2014), and even about free movement of EU citizens (e.g. Avisen.dk, 
2014; Migration Watch UK, 2014). 
 In third countries, public opposition can be expected to the commitments on irregular 
migration contained in a Mobility Partnership, in particular the requirement to sign a 
readmission agreement. In Senegal, for example, a readmission agreement that had been 
agreed with Switzerland was not submitted to the parliament for ratification due to intense 
public opposition (Ellermann, 2008, p.168). This partly explains why the Senegalese 
government decided not to participate in the Mobility Partnership (Reslow, 2013, p.218). 
However, governments armed with the knowledge of negative public opinion may choose not 
to sign a Mobility Partnership in the first place. The voluntary nature of this policy instrument 
may thus have a positive effect on the implementation process. Future research should 
examine the nature of public opinion in third countries that have agreed to a Mobility 
Partnership. 
 
4.10 Mobilisation of interest groups and elites 
The mobilisation of interest groups and elites has been shown to be a deciding factor in the 
decision-making process on Mobility Partnerships (Reslow, 2013). However, no general 
conclusion can be drawn in this respect as elites’ positions vary across countries: the French 
government, for instance, was very committed to getting this new policy instrument off the 
ground, whilst the Austrian government was concerned that Mobility Partnerships resembled 
the old guest-worker schemes and therefore vigorously opposed them at EU level. Even 
within a single member state, elites may be up against one another: in the Netherlands (which 
has joined some of the Mobility Partnerships), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
was opposed to participation, but could not prevent it in the face of support from the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice. The question of how the implementation process 
functions in countries where elites are divided is a highly pertinent one for future research on 
the Mobility Partnerships. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has assessed the prospects for successful implementation of the Mobility 
Partnerships, and finds reason to be optimistic. The voluntary nature of this policy instrument 
may eliminate some of the obstacles identified by the implementation literature, in particular 
in the member states. Member states choose to participate in a Mobility Partnership and have 
been included in the policy-making process. They are also free to suggest projects for 
implementation. Implementing officials might therefore be expected to have a positive 
disposition towards this policy instrument. However, Knill and Lenschow (2000, pp.26-27) 
caution against placing too much faith in ‘new’ policy tools, which incorporate some degree 
of flexibility or voluntary participation: these instruments still share characteristics with 
traditional policy tools, and cannot be expected to eliminate their problems. Indeed, they may 
actually be “too passive in their design to mobilise either the administration or the general 
public… Flexible design and open institutional and procedural structures may create 
confusion rather than incentives to act”. 
 Third countries also choose to sign the Mobility Partnership, and may weigh negative 
public opinion against the incentives for cooperating with the EU. However, the analysis 
showed that implementation may depend on the specific third country concerned, and the type 
of project being implemented. Financial and organisational capacities vary between countries, 
and even those third countries that sign a Mobility Partnership are concerned about certain of 
the commitments it entails, particularly on readmission. There is thus a real need to learn from 
past experience, in order to develop a best practice for implementation of Mobility 
Partnerships. Given that the last official evaluation of this policy instrument was carried out 
by the Commission in 2009, such an exercise is long overdue. Scholars should focus on the 
disposition of implementing officials, the nature of public opinion, and the interactions 
between the actors involved in implementation. Given the lack of information in the public 
domain about the Mobility Partnerships (the scoreboards, for instance, are not publically 
available), such research efforts will require in-depth interviews.  
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